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Introduction
Whether you are a Christian or not, you cannot deny the truth of
the proverb “[a] brother offended is more unyielding than a strong
city, and quarrelling is like the bars of a castle,”1 especially when you
study the constitutional relationship between the Netherlands and its
former colonies Aruba, Curacao, and St. Maarten.
The Netherlands, Aruba, Curacao and St. Maarten are four countries that together constitute the Kingdom of the Netherlands.2 These
countries feel so wronged by one another that emotions often take
over. In July 2014, for instance, the Prime Minister of Aruba desperately went on a hunger strike because he felt that the autonomy of
Aruba had been illegally infringed upon as the Kingdom Government
ordered the Governor of Aruba not to sign the country’s budget. The
reasoning behind this order was in response to an opinion of the
Kingdom Government that the debt had grown explosively and that
this budget aggravated the problem. Subsequently, the Prime Minister of Aruba believed that the dispute settlement procedure between
the Kingdom, ‘central’ (predominantly Dutch) government, and ‘local’ government was useless.3 He felt that the Dutch government
would be overrepresented in this procedure, and he was afraid that
the Dutch government would maintain its stance.4 The Dutch government urged for reasonableness.5

1.
2.

3.

Proverbs 18:19 (ESV).
The Kingdom of the Netherlands is not just a country in North-West Europe headed by
a King; part of the Kingdom is situated in the Caribbean. In fact, it extends to three
more Caribbean islands, Bonaire, St. Eustatius and Saba; these three islands are constitutionally part of the Netherlands (in North-West Europe). STATUUT NED [CHARTER]
art. 1.
Premier Eman from Aruba Hunger Strike, DE TELEGRAAF, (July 11, 2014),
http://www.telegraaf.nl/binnenland/22846081/__Premier_Aruba_in_hongerstaking__.
html.
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Although the ‘Aruban matter’ has now been resolved, this case
demonstrates the seriousness of the debates on the interpretation of
the Charter,6 especially with regard to the division of competencies
and power between the Kingdom government and the governments of
the respective countries.7 These conflicts have, of course, a history
and the underlying emotions go deep.
Today, the deadlock in the Kingdom’s relationships is marked by
the absence of an independent dispute settlement procedure, notwithstanding the agreement between the four countries to establish such
procedure on the Kingdom’s level.8 For a long time, the Netherlands

4.

5.

6.

7.

Although not the Council of Ministers of the Kingdom, which consists of the Dutch
Council of Ministers plus one minister plenipotentiary of each Caribbean country, but
a delegation of the Council of Ministers of the Kingdom would decide. For completeness, the dispute settlement procedure is laid down in Art. 12 of the Charter; the key
‘passages’ of the Article for this purpose read: If the Minister Plenipotentiary of either
the Netherlands Antilles or Aruba has serious objections to the initial opinion of the Council of Ministers on the binding nature of the provision referred to in paragraph 1, or on any
other matter in the consideration of which he has participated, deliberations thereon shall
continue at his request, if necessary having regard to a time-limit to be determined by the
Council of Ministers. The deliberations referred to above shall be conducted by the Prime
Minister, two Ministers, the Minister Plenipotentiary and a Minister or special representative to be designated by the Government concerned. If both Ministers Plenipotentiary desire to participate in the continued deliberations, these deliberations shall be conducted by
the Prime Minister, two Ministers and the two Ministers Plenipotentiary. Article 10, paragraph 2 shall apply mutatis mutandis. STATUUT NED [CHARTER] art. 12, paras. 2-4.
Plasterk Calling Hunger Strike of Eman Undesirable, NEDERLANDSDAGBLAD (July 14,
2014), http://www.nd.nl/artikelen/2014/juli/14/plasterk-noemt-hongerstaking-emanonwenselijk.
The Charter is the highest constitutional document of the Kingdom of the Netherlands.
STATUUT NED [Charter] pmbl. For completeness, this example of the hunger strike is
only one out of numerous cases of serious conflict. Some other recent cases are: Aruba’s (initially forced) participation in the Common Court of Justice of Aruba, Curaçao
and St. Maarten and Bonaire, St. Eustatius and Saba.; see, higher (financial) supervision over Curaçao (although this particular conflict is based on a Kingdom Act, Financial Supervision Act Curaçao and Sint Maarten, Kingdom Act of July 7, 2010 rather
than on the Charter and the integrity test on St. Maarten, Integrity test/screening of
government of St. Maarten, DAILY HERALD (Oct. 20, 2014),
http://www.dutchcaribbeanlegalportal.com/news/latest-news/4357-second-chamberbacks-st-maarten-instruction.
The relevant articles are – at least – 3 and 43, STATUUT NED [CHARTER] art. 3, sub. 1,
43.
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defended the stance that they should be able to ultimately overrule
the Caribbean countries; the Netherlands feels that given that it is the
largest partner (ca. 17,000,000 inhabitants), its policies must not be
overridden by the interest of a Caribbean country which represents
either ca. 35,000 people (St. Maarten), ca. 100,000 (Aruba), or ca.
140,000 (Curacao).9 The Caribbean countries argue their right to
self-determination, which means they cannot be overruled in the
event that the law is applied incorrectly at the expense of their autonomy.10 Of course, we do not argue that the Netherlands insists on being able to breach the law when it wants to enforce its policy. However, even if all parties would agree that only disputes about the
interpretation of the law could be litigated, one must note that the line
between law and policy is thin. Is interference with national budgets
based on constitutional norms a matter of law or policy? Consequently one might wonder if litigation would be the answer to resolve
this highly emotional issue and whether it could solve the underlying
conflict.
In this paper, we propose a different approach to resolve this
problem inspired by the South African Constitution, which focuses
on cooperation.11 Section 41, subsection 3 and 4 of the South African
Constitution reads:
(3) An organ of state involved in an intergovernmental dispute must make every reasonable effort to settle the dispute
by means of mechanisms and procedures provided for that
purpose, and must exhaust all other remedies before it approaches a court to resolve the dispute;
8.

9.
10.

11.
13.

STATUUT NED [Charter] art. 12A. In May the inter-parliamentarian meeting reopened
the discussion, by giving their respective governments a clear task to establish a dispute settlement procedure. However, despite this effort, in June the Governments still
did not reach an agreement on the matter. Kingdom Conference Fails to Agree on Dispute Regulation, DUTCH CARIBBEAN LEGAL PORTAL (June 17, 2015, 8:58 AM),
http://www.dutchcaribbeanlegalportal.com/news/latest-news/5408-kingdomconference-fails-to-agree-on-dispute-regulation. Today, the discussion still prolongs.
CORNELIS BORMAN, HET STATUUT VOOR HET KONINKRIJK 22 (Kluwer 2005).
Irene Broekhuijse, The constitutional equality of the countries of the Kingdom of the
Netherlands: reality or perception?, 271-73 (thesis, Utrecht University 2012).
http://dspace.library.uu.nl/bitstream/handle/1874/254907/broekhuijse.pdf?
S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 41.
Id.
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(4) If a court is not satisfied that the requirements of subsection (3) have been met, it may refer a dispute back to the organs of state involved.12
Likewise, rather than focusing on litigation, we focus on cooperation. We believe that the law, specifically the dispute settlement
procedure, must be framed in such a way that cooperation is promoted.13 Presently, the overarching legal framework seems to be designed in a way that the different interests of the respective countries
are acknowledged, underpinned, and highlighted. Given the present
legal framework, which allowed this conflict to arise, and the legacy
of colonialism, it can be challenging to establish a new paradigm.
With reference to the communication theory “the Rose of Leary,”14
we will illustrate why we believe such a paradigm shift may be necessary despite these difficulties.
In order to develop our argument, we successively provide an insight into the colonial history of the “Dutch West Indies,” discuss
how the present legal framework stimulates disassociation, and briefly mention the main idea of the Rose of Leary and how this model
can be used to marginalize the emotional, but particularly conflictual
situation. We conclude with a brief summary reinforcing our argument.
A Historical Background
Let us begin by providing some insight into the history of the
Kingdom of the Netherlands. After all, if we are to understand the
difficulties of today, we have to understand its causes. As it goes too
far to give an extensive overview of a history of more than three centuries, which is how long the connection between the Netherlands
and the Caribbean parts of the Kingdom exists, let us highlight one
12.
13.
14.

Id.
Although of course we acknowledge that – like in the South-African Constitution – a
provision must be made to allow for litigation as an ultimum remedium. Id.
TIMOTHY LEARY, MULTILEVEL MEASUREMENT OF INTERPERSONAL BEHAVIOR: A
MANUAL FOR THE USE OF THE INTERPERSONAL SYSTEM OF PERSONALITY 1 (1956). For
a brief and an accessible explanation of this theory, please view: Sjoerd Wapperom,
Modeling Interpersonal Stance in Affective Conversations in Police Interrogations, U.
OF TWENTE, ¶ 2.2., http://hmi.ewi.utwente.nl/verslagen/capita-selecta/RT-WapperomSjoerd.pdf (last visited June 15, 2015).
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particular and recurring cause that created emotionally deep wounds
within the Kingdom relationships: colonialism and unfruitful decisions regarding the colonial and later post-colonial administration.15
Two particular related and recurring causes that have created emotionally deep relationship wounds within the Kingdom are colonialism and unfruitful decisions regarding the colonial and post-colonial
administration.
The problem is thus twofold. On the one hand there is this tension between the metropolis and the (former) colonies, and on the
other hand, there is great tension between the respective islands.16 Below we limit our discussion of the former observation, as we believe
that the tension between the metropolis and the (former) colonies
speaks for itself. We will provide further explanation on the latter observation below.
In sum, these islands have been united seemingly against their
will and without essential common interests.17 Moreover, even after
the decolonization in 1954, the smaller islands still felt dominated,
although this time by Curacao, the largest and historically main island.18 The prevailing view was that Curacao took better care of itself as an independent unit than the Netherlands Antilles as a whole;
consequently the islands developed not only a hostile attitude towards
their former colonizer, the Netherlands, but also towards each other.19
Disregarding the autonomy granted by the Netherlands, the autonomy was thus not necessarily experienced. It was not until October 10, 2010 that the five islands20 ceased to be united as a country.21

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

20.

21.

BORMAN, supra note 9, at 1.
A.B. VAN RIJN, STAATSRECHT VAN DE NEDERLANDSE ANTILLEN, DEVENTER: W.E.J.
TJEENK WILLINK 33 (1999).
H.W.C. BORDEWIJK, ONTSTAAN EN ONTWIKKELING VAN HET STAATSRECHT VAN
CURAÇAO, 84, 92 (Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff 1911).
VAN RIJN, supra note 16, at 33.
GERT OOSTINDIE & INGE KLINKERS, GEDEELD KONINKRIJK, DE ONTMANTELING VAN DE
NEDERLANDSE ANTILLEN EN DE VERNIEUWING VAN DE TRANS-ATLANTISCHE RELATIES
21-36 (Amsterdam University Press 2012).
OOSTINDIE & KLINKERS, supra note 19, at 7; CHARLOTTE M.A.M. DUIJF & ALFRED
H.A. SOONS, THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION AND THE DISSOLUTION OF THE
NETHERLANDS ANTILLES 1 (Wolf Legal 2011), Aruba left the constitutional framework
of the Netherlands Antilles already on the 1st of January 1986 and acquired the status
of country within the Kingdom of the Netherlands.
Id.
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On this date, the country ‘Netherlands Antilles’ was finally dissolved.22 Curacao and St. Maarten became countries within the Kingdom of the Netherlands; constitutionally Bonaire, St. Eustatius and
Saba, the smallest islands became part of the Netherlands.23 Although the dissolution of the country happened peacefully, it left a big
emotional impact on the islands, which would prove to have farreaching consequences. Autonomy was considered a national trophy,
especially for St. Maarten and previously for Aruba. At last they are
not dominated by other powers on a day-to-day level, and they have
decided to defend it forcefully. The battle for autonomy also had an
impact on a different level: the legal framework has proven to be able
to adapt to changes as the result of a conflict.24 Against the original
will of the Netherlands, the Caribbean countries managed at last to
renegotiate their constitutional position, thus the conflict proved effective.25
During colonial times, there does not seem to be a clear point in
which the islands cooperated effectively, nor were their common interests detected and promoted. The Netherlands Antilles therefore inherited a legacy, which hardly contained any social, economic, cultural infrastructures, or shared interests between the respective
islands. In essence, six islands that had hardly anything in common,
were united administratively for centuries. The only theme of the colonial history that unites the islands is the disregard of their distinct
nature. In 1815, the Kingdom of the Netherlands adopted its first
Constitution, which divided the islands into two colonies: St. Maarten, St. Eustatius and Saba, on which inhabitants spoke English and
Curacao (and subordinations, i.e. Aruba and Bonaire), on which the
local language was Papiamentu/Papiamento.26
This situation lasted for thirteen years. In 1828, Surinam, Curacao (and subordinations, i.e. Aruba and Bonaire), St. Maarten, St. Eustatius, and Saba were administratively united.27 Although each of
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Id.
CHARLOTTE M.A.M. DUIJF & ALFRED H.A. SOONS, THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION
AND THE DISSOLUTION OF THE NETHERLANDS ANTILLES 1 (Wolf Legal 2011).
See infra Section 3.
DUIJF & SOONS, supra note 23, at 15.
Id. at 3.
GERT OOSTINDIE & INGE KLINKERS, DECOLONISING THE CARIBBEAN: DUTCH POLICIES
IN A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 58 (AMSTERDAM UNIVERSITY PRESS 2003).
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these colonies kept their local administration, they were all responsible to “Paramaribo,” the capital of Surinam, where the head office of
the colonial administration was situated.28 Fransen Van de Putte, the
then Dutch Minister of colonies, admitted that they had nothing in
common, except for their administration.29 Centuries later, Oostindie,
a contemporary Dutch historian, commented that the structure was
indeed unfruitful.30
In 1845, the administration changed again: Surinam became a
separate colony from Curacao (and subordinations), St. Maarten, St.
Eustatius and Saba.31 The administration of the islands was established on Curacao, the largest and main island.32 This change was not
necessarily beneficial for the islands, since, the difference was not
merely between the islands and Surinam. As mentioned above, the
language of the local people in Curacao, Aruba, and Bonaire is Papiamentu/Papiamento, while in St. Maarten, St. Eustatius, and Saba
the primary language is English.33 Also, the distance between the
Windward Islands (St. Maarten St. Eustatius and Saba) and the Leeward Islands (Curacao, Aruba and Bonaire) is about 900 kilometers,34
thus escalating cultural differences. It is unthinkable that the Windward Islands and Leeward Island would influence each other culturally, particularly since the possibilities of communication were still
limited in the mid-nineteenth century. In fact, even the islands that
are relatively close to each other could have tremendous differences.
For example, Curacao and Bonaire have a history of slavery until July 1st, 1863, whereas Aruba has not;35 St. Maarten also has a history
of slavery, whereas Saba was famous for piracy.36 Given the circum-

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

BORDEWIJK, supra note 17, at 63.
Broekhuijse, supra note 10, at 24.
Id. at 25.
VAN RIJN, supra note 16.
Id. at 28.
DUIJF & SOONS, supra note 23, at 3.
Id.
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF EMANCIPATION & ABOLITION IN THE TRANSATLANTIC WORLD 189
(Junius Rodriguez, Ed. 2007).
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stances (large distance and limited means of communication), one
might wonder if all local interests could be sufficiently taken into
consideration; for example, one might ask whether the administration
on Curacao was sufficiently aware of the state of affairs on the other
islands.
This question is perhaps the key question in history, for even
after the colonial administration gained more influence on the colonial affairs, and ultimately after the decolonization in 1954, Curacao
was always regarded as the ‘main island’ that particularly took care
of its own affairs; even at (according to emotional experiences) the
expense of other islands. Without incentives and good infrastructure
to cooperate,37 the islands ultimately persisted in the dissolution of
the Netherlands Antilles.38
One might wonder why it was considered necessary for the six
islands to remain together after the decolonization in 1954, if it was
clear that the islands had not much in common and were not attired
with a good infrastructure and communication abilities. Was the union of the six islands merely unfruitful, or were there also good causes? Whether there was good cause falls outside the scope of the present discussion. However, one cause which was considered important
was the ability to maintain a sufficient level of good governance.
Because the islands are small and fragile, people are prone to favor
those they know. How then, could they, for instance, establish an independent court and maintain a complete judicial system? The issue
would be marginalized when representatives of the islands cooperated in such affairs as, maintaining a judicial system, deciding on the
spending of public money, etc.39

36.

37.
38.

For some more informal information on the historical background of these two islands,
please view: History and Culture, SABA DUTCH CARIBBEAN,
http://www.sabatourism.com/history.html (last visited Nov. 27, 2015); Slavery and
Emancipation, ST. MAARTEN NAT’L HERITAGE FOUND.,
http://www.museumsintmaarten.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id
=83&Itemid=117 (last visited Dec. 17, 2015).
Etienne Ys, former Prime Minister of the Netherlands Antilles, Presentation at the National Constitutional Law Conference of the Netherlands (Dec. 19, 2015).
DUIJF & SOONS, supra note 23, at 14-15. Except for St. Eustatius, the only island
which voted in favor of the Netherlands Antilles.
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The dissolution of the Netherlands Antilles did not, consequently, establish full autonomy for the Caribbean countries. The Netherlands demanded that the islands prolonged their cooperation in certain affairs, such as maintaining the judicial system.40 The autonomy
was still greater than the event in which they remained an island territory of the Netherlands Antilles. They also faced another novelty that
potentially affected this newly gained autonomy, which could actually diminish their level of autonomy. The newly established Caribbean countries noticed that the Charter was now directly applicable to
them, including the provision on supervision.41 Since October 10,
2010, the Netherlands has been willing to make use of their power to
supervise, whether it was because of disagreement on spending public money or because of the appointment of government ministers and
the alleged malfunctioning of local ‘national’ authorities.42 This resulted from the call for recolonization and the increased accusations
of ill-government and thievery. The fact that all Caribbean countries
‘fight for their autonomy’ against the Netherlands, they may, at last,
cooperate in order to implement a independent dispute settlement
procedure.
For nearly the past five years, governments have sought a solution to resolve this severe problem.43 Needless to say, that due to the
economic crisis, which also hit the Netherlands and affected the islands, the solution must be affordable. Given the tremulous history,

39.

40.

41.

42.
43.

The reasons to unite the islands are different from the motives to unite the islands administratively in the colonial era. During colonial times the organisation of the administration of the ‘West-Indies’ changed numerous times. The outcome of a change
seems usually the result of financial considerations. In any case it did not always seem
to the benefits of the colony, whilst the administrative structure appears to be most
economical.
Aruba continued to participate in the Court of Justice of the Netherlands Antilles when
it acquired the status of country within the Kingdom. The Court was later renamed:
The Common Court of Justice of the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba. Luc Verhey,
Slotakkoord of nieuw begin, enkele algemene beschouwingen over het nieuwe koninkrijk, in WETTEN VOOR DE WEST, 27, 29 (Alfred Roos & Luc Verhey ed. 2010).
Irene Broekhuijse & Roxan Venter, Constitutional Law from an Emotional Point of
View: Considering Regional and Local Interests in National Decision-Making, XXVII
WORLD CONGRESS OF THE INT’L ASS’N FOR THE PHIL. OF L. AND SOC. PHIL. (IVR) 15
(2006), https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B7v1_whu0-coRXFpTFJuYVl3LTg/view.
Id. at 12.
Verhey, supra note 40.
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it could be difficult to reach an agreement that will satisfy all countries.
The Present Legal Framework
So far, we established that the conflicts within the Kingdom of
the Netherlands are of a serious nature and that these negative feelings are fed by historical events. Besides these, there are other causes
of disassociation that need to be taken into account: the structure of
legal framework; the maximization of the autonomy of the respective
countries; and the structure of the Kingdom institutions.44 The structure of the institutions encourages and fosters the respective countries
to plea for their own cause, rather than promoting a focus on common
interests. The aforementioned legal framework will be spelled out
below in the interest of completeness.45
A. Autonomy
Concretely, after the decolonization of the Dutch West Indian
colonies, emphasis was laid on the autonomy of the Caribbean countries of the Kingdom.46 In short, three legal orders (then: the Netherlands, Surinam and the Netherlands Antilles, at present four: the
Netherlands, Aruba, Curaçao and St. Maarten were created within the
international legal subject ‘the Kingdom of the Netherlands.’47

44.

45.

46.

47.

Kingdom of the Netherlands: One Kingdom – Four Countries; European and Caribbean, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFF.,
https://www.government.nl/documents/leaflets/2015/06/05/kingdom-of-thenetherlands-one-kingdom-four-countries-european-and-caribbean.
Paragraphs 3.1 and 3.2 are adapted from the paper written by Broekhuijse for the
World Congress on Constitutional Law, June 16-20, 2014 in Oslo. Given it is not part
of an argument but the basic explanation of the constitutional framework, it has not
been rewritten for the present purposes. Also, for illustration we have additionally incorporated numerous articles of the Charter. For more information on the legal framework please see, Broekhuijse & Venter, supra note 41 (the legal framework is briefly
spelled out in the joint paper of Venter and Broekhuijse, which has also been submitted for the XXVII World Congress of the International Association for the Philosophy
of Law and Social Philosophy).
Carribean Parts of the Kingdom, New Constitutional Order, GOV. OF THE
NETHERLANDS (Dec. 15, 2008), https://www.government.nl/topics/caribbean-parts-ofthe-kingdom/contents/new-constitutional-order.
Id.
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The Caribbean countries of the Kingdom conduct all affairs independently,48 unless the Charter indicates that the Kingdom has jurisdiction.49 As it states, the number of Kingdom affairs is limited;
these can be found mainly, but not exclusively50 in the Articles 3 paragraph 1 and Article 43 paragraph 2 of the Charter, as well as in Article 5. These articles state:
Article 3 Paragraph 1
Without prejudice to provisions elsewhere in the Charter,
Kingdom affairs shall include:
a. Maintenance of the independence and the defence of
the Kingdom;
b. Foreign relations;
c. Dutch nationality;
d. Regulation of the orders of chivalry, the flag and the
coat of arms of the Kingdom;
e. Regulation of the nationality of vessels and the
standards required for the safety and navigation of
seagoing vessels flying the flag of the Kingdom,
with the exception of sailing ships;
f. Supervision of the general rules governing the admission and expulsion of Dutch nationals;
g. General conditions for the admission and expulsion
of aliens;
h. Extradition.51
Article 43
1. Each of the Countries shall promote the realization of
fundamental human rights and freedoms, legal certainty
and good governance.
48.

49.
50.
51.

Albeit not entirely, as mentioned above the Caribbean countries still have to cooperate
with each other in certain affairs for purposes of good governance. However, in principle they are autonomous.
OOSTINDIE & KLINKERS, supra note 27, at 94.
See, e.g. STATUUT NED [Charter] arts. 44 & 45.
Translation of this and other articles by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Department of
Translation (Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, Directie Vertalingen (AVT)). Bulletin
of Acts and Decrees of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, Nov. 1, 2010, 4. See
STATUUT NED [Charter] art. 3.
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2. The safeguarding of such rights and freedoms, legal certainty and good governance shall be a Kingdom affair.52
Article 5
1. The Monarchy and the succession to the Throne, the Organs of the Kingdom referred to in the Charter, and the
exercise of royal and legislative power in Kingdom affairs shall be governed, if not provided for by the Charter, by the Constitution of the Kingdom.
2. The Constitution shall have regard to the provisions of
the Charter.
3. Articles 15 to 20 inclusive shall apply to any proposal
for amendment of the Constitution containing provisions
concerning Kingdom affairs, as well as to the Bill stating
the grounds for considering such a proposal.53
It may be added, that Article 5 relates to the ‘autonomy’ of the
Netherlands. Article 5 provides that the Caribbean countries are to be
involved in the amendment of the Constitution to the extent that the
amendment relates to the organization and competences of, for example, the legislative and the administrative powers.54 This is on account of the agreement with Kingdom authorities. Also, it must be
stated that Article 43 section 2 of the Charter is no more than a safeguard.55 In principle, the countries are autonomous. According to
the memorandum, the Kingdom authorities are only permitted to interfere in the event that the authorities of the country cannot restore
the situation by themselves.56 However, the measures taken by the
Kingdom government have to be proportional.57
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

57.

Bulletin of Acts and Decrees of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, Nov. 1, 2010, 14-15.
See STATUUT NED [Charter] art. 43.
Bulletin of Acts and Decrees of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, Nov. 1, 2010, 4-5.
See STATUUT NED [Charter] art. 5.
STATUUT NED [Charter] art. 5.
STATUUT NED [Charter] art. 43, sec. 2 (emphasis added).
Id.; Irene Broekhuijse, The Challenges of the Constitutional Structure of the Kingdom
of the Netherlands: A ‘Quasi-Federal’ State in Post-Colonial Context, 7 (2014),
https://www.jus.uio.no/english/research/news-andevents/events/conferences/2014/wccl-cmdc/wccl/papers/ws2/w2-broekhuijse.pdf.
STATUUT NED [Charter] art. 51; The Challenges of the Constitutional Structure, supra
note 57.
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Furthermore, in Article 39, the Charter stipulates the principle of
legal concordance with regard to several areas. Article 39 states:
Article 39
Civil and commercial law, the law of civil procedure, criminal law, the law of criminal procedure, copyright, industrial
property, the office of notary, and provisions concerning
weights and measures shall be regulated as far as possible in
a similar manner in the Netherlands, Aruba, Curacao and St
Maarten (section 1). Any proposal for drastic amendment of
the existing legislation in regard to these matters shall not be
submitted to or considered by a representative assembly until the Governments in the other Countries have had the opportunity to express their views on the matter (section 2).58
Arguably, neither country is entirely autonomous in these affairs.
B. Autonomy Guaranteed when Cooperating
Under Article 38 of the Charter, the countries can cooperate in
autonomous affairs, should they desire to do so.59 It is even possible
that the respective governments will negotiate on agreements that
will later become legislative proposals. During the entire legislative
procedure, in the event the proposal has been amended by parliament
in a way that is deemed unacceptable, the respective governments can
declare on behalf of their country that the consensus ceases to exist.60
C. Influence in Kingdom Affairs
A large degree of autonomy was awarded to the Caribbean countries of the Kingdom as well, insofar as matters dealt with by the
Kingdom. However, the decisive power in Kingdom affairs remains
ultimately in the hands of the Netherlands, making the Caribbean
countries’ power marginal.61
58.
59.
60.
61.

STATUUT NED [Charter] art. 39.
STATUUT NED [Charter] art. 38.
Cf. Van Dijk, Consensuswetgeving: Een Bijzonder Concept, 25 REGELMAAT 6, 321335 (2010).
BORMAN, supra note 9, at 26.
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Due to the scarcity of manpower in Kingdom affairs available to
Surinam and the Netherlands Antilles, one sought to participate in
Dutch institutions, such as: the Council of Ministers,62 the Council of
State,63 the Court of Cassation,64 and the States General (i.e. Parliament). In sum, the key authorities of the Caribbean countries with regard to their say in Kingdom affairs include: Articles 10, 12, 15, 16,
17, 18, and 23.65
Despite the connection with the Dutch institutions, these Kingdom institutions are constitutionally distinct. Remarkably, the one
exception is that there is no Kingdom parliament; nor can Dutch Caribbean people vote for the Dutch parliament.66 As Steven Hillebrink,
a Dutch scholar, argues: “[t]here is no Kingdom parliament, although
it could be argued that the Dutch parliament, the Staten-Generaal,
functions as such, because it approves Kingdom acts and international treaties, and applies to the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba.”67
The Caribbean representation in these institutions is minimal,
and apart from the Council of Ministers of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, optional.68 By way of compensation for this minimal representation a number of provisions were included in order to counteract
possible unilateral dominance by the Netherlands.69 Examples of such
provisions, other than the aforementioned Articles 12 (the ‘conflict
procedure’) and 18 of the Charter, include Articles 12a70 and 38a,71 as
of the last 2010 Amendment. Apart from those sections, the spirit of
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

67.
68.
69.
70.

71.

Id. at 93.
Art. 17 Council of State Act (addressing the task to advise the Government). Art. 18
Council of State Act (addressing the task to advise the Parliament).
In private law, criminal law and in tax law.
STATUUT NED [Charter] art. 10, 12, 15-18, 23.
Steven Hillebrink, Political Decolonization and Self-Determination; The Case of the
Netherlands Antilles and Aruba 176 (Dissertation Leiden University 2007),
https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/bitstream/handle/1887/11003/000-proefschrifthillebrink-10-01-2007.pdf?sequence=1.
Id. at 147 (remarked in BORMAN, supra note 9, at ¶ 5.9) (emphasis added).
Hillebrink, supra note 66, at 147.
Broekhuijse, supra note 10, at 24.
Id. at 9. Article 12a: Provisions shall be made by Kingdom Act for settling disputes between the Kingdom and the Countries which are designated by Kingdom Act. It is this
procedure that we are presently still awaiting.
Id. Article 38a: The Countries may enter into mutual arrangements for settling disputes
between them. Article 38, paragraph 2 applies. See STATUUT NED [Charter] art. 38, sub.
a.
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the Charter, constitutional equality, would occupy a central position
in Kingdom relationships. However, rather than being the conflict
procedure for resolving the issue, it is far more often a source of irritation: the countries essentially plea for their own cause and this
makes it a competition with ‘winners’ and ‘losers’.
The Rose of Leary
So far we have mainly focused on the problems and some of
there causes within the Kingdom. In this paragraph we work towards
a proposed solution: from conflict to cooperation. Although in the introduction of this paper we acknowledge our inspiration from the
South-African Constitution, which focuses on cooperation, we take it
one step further and pay attention to the communicative theory ‘the
Rose of Leary’ (for matrix view, see appendix II). We argue that this
theory is useful for the present purpose despite the fact that it has
been written based on the behavior and personalities of human beings
and not on that of states. In our view, it can be used to explain the
actions and reactions between states, and in general behavior. Both
people and states/governments (groups of people) can be, for instance, dominant, rebellious, distrustful, or cooperative. In addition
to the South-African Constitution, this model could assist to establish
more specifically which kind of behaviour parties should show in order to create the most beneficial outcome: whether one should take
the lead and others should follow, and if so to what degree. The law
could then be framed to promote this behaviour.
A. The Theory in a Nutshell
In the 1950s, a scientist named Timothy Leary co-developed a
theory on personalities and behaviour.72 His most famous work in this
regard perhaps, is The Interpersonal Diagnosis of Personality, published in 1957.73 The original work is highly technical and mathematical,74 but other authors have simplified it over time.75
72.
73.
74.
75.

TIMOTHY LEARY, INTERPERSONAL DIAGNOSES OF PERSONALITY: A FUNCTIONAL
THEORY AND METHODOLOGY FOR PERSONALITY EVALUATION 15-16 (1957).
Id.
LEARY, supra note 14.
LEARY, supra note 72. For the sake of completeness, the simplified model is the one
we studied.
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The model that Leary presents is a circular matrix, which contains two main axes.76 The vertical axis relates to dominance (the top
part of the axis) and submission (the bottom part of the axis); the horizontal axis relates to hostility (the left part of the axis) and the
‘love’/cooperation (the right part of the axis).77 Within this diagram,
one finds different ways of interaction, of which eight are, according
to Arthur L. Kobler, distinguished as “generic ways of interaction for
the use as the overall variable system.”78 These are, in counterclockwise order:
(1) Managerial-Autocratic,
(2) Competitive-Narcissistic,
(3) Aggressive-Sadistic,
(4) Rebellious-Distrustful,
(5) Self-Effacing-Masochistic,
(6) Docile-Dependent,
(7) Cooperative-Overconventional, and
(8) Responsible-Hypernormal.79
To make it simpler, as described by Sjoerd Wapperom as: “(1) leading, (2) helping, (3) cooperative, (4) dependent, (5) withdrawn, (6)
defiant, (7) aggressive, and (8) competitive.”80
In sum, these types of behavior are not ‘merely’ classified in the
matrix, but the model can also be used as a prediction for reactions.
For instance, as Wapperom explains, dominant behavior invites submissive behavior and vice versa, and aggressive behavior invites aggressive behavior, just as cooperative behavior, invites cooperative
behavior.81 Kingdom partners could use this knowledge, not only to
be become aware of the issue, but also to influence others positively,
to see if the deadlock could be overcome.

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

81.

Id. at 2.
Id.
Arthur L. Kobler, Book Review, 29 HUM. BIOLOGY 378, 379-80 (1957).
Id.
Sjoerd Wapperom, Modeling Interpersonal Stance in Affective Conversations in Police
Interrogations, U. OF TWENTE, ¶ 2.2., http://hmi.ewi.utwente.nl/verslagen/capitaselecta/RT-Wapperom-Sjoerd.pdf (last visited June 15, 2015).
Id.
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Conclusion
In this present paper, we provided basic insight into the historical
background and current legal structure of the Kingdom of the Netherlands in order to illustrate how these causes contribute to and foster
present conflictual situations. Historically, the islands were administratively united for centuries: first in colonial times, and then after the
decolonization in 1954—notwithstanding the fact that they had hardly anything, if anything at all, in common.82 Although in spite of this
required unnatural collaboration, there were also reasons to keep the
islands united after the decolonization. It was held that, given their
small scale, it would be in the interest of the quality of the government and judicial system in which the islands continued to cooperate.
This forced collaboration resulted in a situation in which the islands
did not wish to cooperate with each other at all and, finally in 2010, it
led to the dissolution of the Netherlands Antilles.83 Although the islands that became countries gained a high level of autonomy in respect to each other, the dissolution of the Netherlands Antilles potentially diminished their autonomy at the core. Whereas, in the event
that the Netherlands, being the largest and ultimately responsible
partner within the Kingdom, interferes, the Netherlands Antilles
could function as a shock-absorber for the islands Aruba, Curacao
and St. Maarten that are now directly exposed to the influence of the
Netherlands.84
In the introduction of this paper, we established that the Netherlands has not been shy to use this power. Consequently, new issues
arose because the Caribbean countries, who fiercely defend their autonomy, accuse the Netherlands of “recolonization.”85 The Netherlands, on their turn, defend and justify the interference, claiming that
their actions are constitutional and, moreover, necessary to maintain
the public order. It seems that in 2010, when the Charter was revised
in order to realize the dissolution of the Netherlands Antilles, all par82.
83.
84.

85.

Broekhuijse, supra note 10, at 45.
Id. at 19.
Id. View for instance the case of St. Maarten and the issue of good governance. In the
early/mid nineteen-nineties, the supervision went via the Governor of the Netherlands
Antilles; he could instruct the local authorities. Today, the Governor of St. Maarten is
instructed directly by the Kingdom government.
Premier Eman, supra note 3.
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ties anticipated a conflict. In a new Article 12a, it was arranged that
they would find a way to establish a suitable dispute settlement procedure.86 For a long time, we kept searching for a solution within the
existing paradigm, the existing legal framework. However, this paradigm fosters conflictual situations, so it is doubtful if a “solution”
within this paradigm would ever resolve the matter. After all, as established, the present legal framework focuses particularly on the
maximization of the autonomy and political disassociation in the
Kingdom institutions.
Indeed, there are (predominantly private) initiatives that focus on
cooperation, but we need the law in order to cure this situation of
non-collaborative behaviour, because some core issues, such as good
governance are at stake. It becomes clear that today, the historical
background, combined with the present legal framework, pushed the
Kingdom relationships in the left “hostile” part of the circle of “the
Rose of Leary,” which we discussed.87 We argue that if we are to
marginalize the conflicts within the Kingdom relationships, we
should not focus on the resolution of the legal conflicts, e.g., through
litigation; instead, we need to position ourselves in the right “cooperative” part of the circular matrix.88 It is this side of the matrix that
serves the better purposes for the Kingdom relationships. Consequently, when the governments design the required and promised
dispute settlement procedure, they need to take into account that its
nature would be collaborative rather than competitive, such as litigation or constitutional review. Of course, it is understandable that given the legacy this might be difficult. However, as long as the governments of the countries within the Kingdom of the Netherlands do
not change in attitude, it is possible that the real, underlying conflicts
can be resolved.

86.

87.
88.

This article states: Provisions shall be made by Kingdom Act for settling disputes between the Kingdom and the Countries which are designated by Kingdom Act. It is this
procedure that we are presently still awaiting. Broekhuijse, supra note 11, at 69.
Wapperom, supra note 80, at 2.
Id. It falls outside the scope of this paper to establish in which concrete corner(s).
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APPENDIX I: A Selection of Articles from the Charter
Article 10
1. The Minister Plenipotentiary shall participate in the
deliberations of the Council of Ministers and of the
permanent boards and special committees of the
Council whenever Kingdom affairs are discussed
which affect the Country in question.
2. The Governments of Aruba, Curacao and St Maarten
shall be entitled to appoint – if they see reason to do
so in relation to a particular matter – a Minister, in
addition to the Minister Plenipotentiary, to participate with an advisory vote in the deliberations referred to in the preceding paragraph.
Article 12
1. If the Minister Plenipotentiary of Aruba, Curacao or St
Maarten, indicating his reasons for expecting that a proposed instrument containing generally binding rules
would be seriously detrimental to his Country, has declared that his Country could not be bound by such an instrument, the instrument may not be adopted in such a
way as to apply to the Country concerned, unless such a
course would be inconsistent with the Country’s ties with
the Kingdom.
2. If the Minister Plenipotentiary of Aruba, Curacao or St
Maarten has serious objections to the initial opinion of
the Council of Ministers on the binding nature of the provision referred to in paragraph 1, or on any other matter
in the consideration of which he has participated, deliberations thereon shall continue at his request, if necessary
having regard to a time-limit to be determined by the
Council of Ministers.
3. The deliberations referred to above shall be conducted by
the Prime Minister, two Ministers, the Minister Plenipotentiary and a Minister or special representative to be
designated by the Government concerned.
4. If several Ministers Plenipotentiary desire to participate
in the continued deliberations, these deliberations shall be
conducted by these Ministers Plenipotentiary, the same
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number of Ministers and the Prime Minister. Article 10,
paragraph 2 shall apply mutatis mutandis.
5. The Council of Ministers shall take a decision in accordance with the result of the continued deliberations. If the
opportunity for continued deliberations has not been utilised within the time-limit specified, the Council of Ministers shall decide.
Article 15
1. The King shall forward Bills for Kingdom Acts, at the
same time as they are introduced in the States General, to
the representative assemblies of Aruba, Curacao and St
Maarten.
2. If a Bill for a Kingdom Act was initiated by the States
General, the Bill shall be forwarded by the House of Representatives immediately following its introduction in the
House of Representatives.
3. The Minister Plenipotentiary of Aruba, Curacao or St
Maarten shall have the power to propose that the House
of Representatives initiate a Kingdom Bill.
Article 16
The representative assembly of the Country in which the
legislation is to apply shall be empowered, before the Bill
is publicly debated in the House of Representatives, to
examine the Bill and to issue a written report thereon, if
necessary within a fixed time-limit.
Article 17
1. The Minister Plenipotentiary of the Country in which the
legislation is to apply shall be afforded the opportunity to
attend the debates on the Bill in the States General and to
furnish such information to the Senate and House of Representatives as he considers desirable.
2. The representative assembly of the Country in which the
legislation is to apply may decide to designate, for the
purposes of the debate on a particular Bill in the States
General, one or more special delegates who shall like-
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wise be empowered to attend the debates and furnish information.
3. The Ministers Plenipotentiary and the special delegates
shall
be
immune
from
any legal proceedings in respect of anything they say in
or submit in writing to the meetings of the Senate or
House of Representatives.
4. The Ministers Plenipotentiary and the special delegates
shall be empowered to propose amendments to a Bill during the proceedings in the House of Representatives.
Article 18
1. Before a final vote is taken on any Kingdom Bill in the
Senate and House of Representatives, the Minister Plenipotentiary of the Country in which the legislation is to
apply shall have the opportunity to express his opinion on
the Bill. If the Minister Plenipotentiary states his opposition to the proposal, he may request the House at the
same time to postpone the vote till the following meeting.
If, after the Minister Plenipotentiary has stated his opposition to the Bill, the House of Representatives adopts it
with a majority of less than three-fifths of the number of
votes cast, the proceedings shall be suspended and the
Council of Ministers shall consider the Bill further.
2. If the meetings of the Senate or House of Representatives
are being attended by special delegates, the power referred to in paragraph 1 shall devolve upon the delegate
designated for the purpose by the representative assembly.
Article 23
1. The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the Netherlands
in respect of legal cases in Aruba, Curacao and St Maarten, and also in Bonaire, Sint Eustatius and Saba, shall be
regulated by Kingdom Act.
2. If the Government of Aruba, Curacao or St Maarten so
requests, the said Kingdom Act shall provide for the addition of a member, an extraordinary member or an advisory member to the Court.
3.
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APPENDIX II: The Rose of Leary

The model which has been attributed to Leary89

89.

LEARY, supra note 72, at 2.
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The model used by Wapperom90

90.

Wapperom, supra note 80, at 2.
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